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Congress christened the 1990s “the decade ofthe brain,” and this was apt from the vantagepoint of the early 21st Century. Great strides
were made in both basic and clinical neuroscience.
What the current decade may, in retrospect, be re-
membered for is the growth of neuroscience beyond
those two categories, “basic” and “clinical,” into a
host of new applications. From the measurement of
mental processes with functional neuroimaging to
their manipulation with ever more selective drugs,
the new capabilities of neuroscience raise unprece-
dented ethical and social issues. These issues must be
identified and addressed if society is to benefit from
the neuroscience revolution now in progress.
Like the field of genetics, cognitive neuroscience
raises questions about the biological foundations of
who we are. Indeed, the relation of self and personal
identity to the brain is, if anything, more direct than
that of self to the genome. In addition, the ethical
questions of neuroscience are more urgent, as neural
interventions are currently more easily accomplished
than genetic interventions. Yet compared to the field
of molecular genetics, in which ethical issues have
been at the forefront since the days of the 1975
Asilomar meeting on recombinant DNA, relatively
little attention has been paid to the ethics of neuro-
science.
This situation is changing, as bioethicists and
neuroscientists are beginning to explore the emerging
social and ethical issues raised by progress in neuro-
science. In the Society for Neuroscience’s recently
formulated mission statement, bioethical issues fig-
ure prominently.1 Numerous articles, meetings, and
symposia have appeared on the subject.2 The term
“neuroethics,” which originally referred to bioethical
issues in clinical neurology, has now been adopted to
refer to ethical issues in the technological advances of
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The eye may be window to the soul, but neuroscientists aim to get inside and measure the interior
directly. Theres also talk about moving some walls.
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neuroscience more generally.3 (Unfor-
tunately, the term is also used to refer
to the neural bases of ethical thinking,
a different topic.4))
Neuroethics encompasses a broad
and varied set of bioethical issues.
Some are similar to those that have
arisen previously in biomedicine,
such as the safety of new research and
treatment methods, the rationing of
promising new therapies, and predic-
tive testing for future illnesses when
no cure is available (as with
Alzheimer’s or Huntington’s disease).
Other neuroethical issues, however,
are unique to neuroscience because of
the particular subject matter of that
field. The brain is the organ of the
mind and consciousness, the locus of
our sense of selfhood. Interventions
in the brain therefore have different
ethical implications than interven-
tions in other organs. In addition, our
growing knowledge of mind-brain re-
lations is likely to affect our defini-
tions of competence, mental health
and illness, and death. Our moral and
legal conceptions of responsibility are
likewise susceptible to change as our
understanding of the physical mecha-
nisms of behavior evolves. Our sense
of the privacy and confidentiality of
our own thought processes may also
be threatened by technologies that
can reveal the neural correlates of our
innermost thoughts.
Many of the new social and ethical
issues in neuroscience result from one
of two developments. The first is the
ability to monitor brain function in
living humans with a spatial and tem-
poral resolution sufficient to capture
psychologically meaningful fluctua-
tions of activity. The second is the
ability to alter the brain with chemi-
cal or anatomical selectivity that is
sufficient to induce specific function-
al changes. For each of these develop-
ments, we will review advances in the
enabling technology and provide ex-
amples of ethically challenging uses of
the technology and an analysis of the
ethical issues they raise.
Neuroimaging
The history of modern brain imag-ing began in the 1970s with
computed axial tomography or CAT
scans and proceeded at a rapid and
accelerating rate for the remaining
decades of the twentieth century. The
idea of passing X-rays through the
head from multiple directions and re-
constructing a three-dimensional
structural image, revolutionary at the
time, was quickly adapted to radio-
logical signals other than X-rays.
These included radiation from exoge-
nous tracers to enable imaging of
brain function, as in positron emis-
sion tomography (PET) and single
photon emission computed tomogra-
phy (SPECT), and endogenously
generated magnetic fields to image ei-
ther structure or function, as in mag-
netic resonance imaging (MRI). Pio-
neering research on cognition and
emotion was undertaken with PET
and SPECT in the 1980s, and by the
1990s MRI, the noninvasive alterna-
tive to PET, became commonplace in
research.5
In an MRI, atoms are first aligned
by a strong static magnetic field, then
knocked out of alignment by a radio
frequency pulse, and then allowed to
realign. The fluctuating field created
as the atoms “relax” to the aligned
state is the signal that is measured. Al-
though early functional MRI used an
injected contrast agent, current meth-
ods use the magnetic properties of the
blood itself as a tracer, and are there-
fore entirely noninvasive. In blood
oxygen level dependent (BOLD)
MRI, the different magnetic suscepti-
bility of oxygenated and deoxygenat-
ed hemoglobin provides a measure of
regional brain activity.6 In arterial
spin labeling (ASL) MRI, the atoms
are aligned by a magnetic field at the
neck, and relax as they circulate
through the brain, indicating regional
perfusion.7 The spatial and temporal
resolution of functional MRI (fMRI)
is limited by haemodynamics rather
than by the physics of the method;
blood flow changes over seconds in
response to neural activity, and these
changes extend into nearby tissue. In
practice, fMRI has a spatial resolution
of one millimeter and a temporal res-
olution of about one second, which is
adequate to distinguish among at
least some psychologically meaning-
ful differences in brain activity.8 A few
additional methods figure in the cog-
nitive neuroimaging revolution. One
is structural MRI, from which precise
measurements of brain size and shape
can be made. Combined with reliable
methods for delineating and measur-
ing particular brain structures, this
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has opened up the field of brain mor-
phometry, in which slight anatomical
variations are correlated with psycho-
logical traits.9 The venerable tech-
niques of electroencephalography
(EEG) and event-related potentials
(ERP) have acquired new capabilities
by the application of signal process-
ing techniques that allow better local-
ization of brain activity and analysis
of temporal patterns of activity.10 Op-
tical methods, such as near infrared
spectroscopy (NIRS), provide anoth-
er noninvasive measure of regional
brain activity based on the absorption
of different wavelengths of light as it
passes through the head.11
By and large, these methods have
been developed for long-standing
clinical and scientific goals, from lo-
calizing seizure foci to studying the
neurochemical abnormalities in psy-
chiatric illness. These uses are associ-
ated with ethical issues of a familiar
nature: for example, the risks of radi-
ation, obtaining adequate informed
consent (especially from the mentally
ill), and the possibility of discovering
incidental brain anomalies. However,
neuroimaging also yields information
that can be used for different purpos-
es, raising new ethical issues. In prin-
ciple, and increasingly in practice,
imaging can be used to infer people’s
psychological traits and states, in
many cases without the person’s co-
operation or consent. It can be used,




Our society’s attitude towardmental illness has come a long
way since 1972, when Senator
Thomas Eagleton was forced to with-
draw his vice presidential candidacy
after his history of depression became
known. Nevertheless, psychiatric ill-
ness continues to carry a stigma, and
a currently healthy individual might
well wish to avoid disclosing a psychi-
atric history. The finding that depres-
sion, schizophrenia, and other illness-
es leave their marks on the brain rais-
es the possibility that psychiatric his-
tory and risk could be inferred from a
brain scan without an individual’s
knowledge or consent. For the most
part, the currently available markers
are morphometric, relying on struc-
tural rather than functional imag-
ing.12
Although the abnormalities that
characterize particular illnesses can be
demonstrated when small groups of
patients are compared to control sub-
jects, they are not currently diagnos-
tic at the individual patient level.
Nevertheless, diagnostic imaging is
currently the goal of many research
groups, with encouraging results for
some disorders, for example
ADHD.13 Should diagnostic imaging
become reliable, the possibility of in-
ferring current or prior psychiatric ill-
ness from images taken for other pur-
poses will also become a concern. 
Imaging of personality 
Anumber of recent studies havesought neuroimaging correlates
of personality found in classic theo-
ries of normal personality, including
extraversion/ introversion, neuroti-
cism, novelty seeking, harm avoid-
ance, and reward dependence.14 Most
of the studies employed resting scans
(that is, scans that were obtained
while subjects were simply resting,
rather than performing any particular
task) of groups of twelve to thirty
healthy subjects, not selected for
being especially extreme on any di-
mension, and they performed corre-
lations between personality scale
scores and brain activation in regions
of a priori interest throughout the
brain. Despite the seemingly low
power of such designs, a number of
positive results have been reported,
with both converging and diverging
results among the studies. The areas
that distinguish normal people with
differing personality at rest include a
large number of cortical and subcor-
tical areas, particularly paralimbic
cortical areas such as the insula, or-
bital frontal cortex, and the anterior
cingulate, as well as subcortical struc-
tures, such as the amygdala and puta-
men.
Canli and colleagues have sought
correlates of personality in the brain’s
response to emotionally evocative
stimuli. Given that many aspects of
personality are most apparent in the
context of frightening, happy, sad, or
tempting stimuli, such an approach
has the potential to identify impor-
tant differences not apparent in rest-
ing scans. In one study, Canli  fo-
cused on two personality traits: extra-
version, which is the tendency to seek
out and enjoy social contact and
maintain an upbeat outlook, and
neuroticism, which is the tendency to
worry and focus on negative informa-
tion.15 They found that extraversion
was correlated with brain response in
several areas to pictures with positive
emotional valence such as puppies,
ice cream, and sunsets. The effect was
specific to positive and not negative
stimuli, and this was confirmed in a
later study with pictures of happy and
fearful faces.16 Neuroticism, in con-
trast, is associated with differences in
response to negative but not positive
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In principle, and increasingly in practice, imaging can be used to 
infer peoples psychological traits and states, in many cases without the 
persons cooperation or consent. It can be used, in effect, as a 
crude form of mind reading.
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stimuli. Photographs of spiders,
cemeteries, crying people, and other
negatively valenced images evoked
more response in certain brain areas
the more neurotic the subject. Posi-
tive pictures did not show such an ef-
fect.
Imaging of Social and Moral
Attitudes 
In a now well-known study, Phelpsand colleagues studied white sub-
jects’ attitudes toward unfamiliar
black faces, using both behavioral
measures and fMRI.17 Using previ-
ously developed behavioral measures,
they were able to estimate the degree
of unconscious negative evaluation of
unfamiliar black as opposed to white
faces. They then measured brain re-
sponse to unfamiliar black and white
faces and found a moderately strong
correlation between individuals’
amygdala activation and the degree of
negative evaluation of black faces.
Racial group identity also has
neural correlates that are roughly
measurable with current brain imag-
ing methods. In a study of black and
white subjects viewing photographs
of black and white faces, significant
differences in response to in-group
and out-group faces were found.18
Differences in the way people view
particular actions as right or wrong,
across specific moral dilemmas and
across individuals, have measurable
neural correlates. In particular,
Greene and colleagues used fMRI to
demonstrate different patterns of
brain activation associated with the
logical weighing of rights and
wrongs. For example, they found that
the emotional centers of the brain
were more active when subjects made
moral decisions based more on their
visceral reactions than on a rational
weighing of costs and benefits.19
Imaging of Preferences 
The objects of a person’s desiresmay also be discernable in some
cases with functional neuroimaging.
The first experiments to demonstrate
this concerned drug craving. Drug-
free cocaine addicts experience a crav-
ing state when shown pictures of
drug paraphernalia, which results in
reliable group differences in PET ac-
tivation of limbic and paralimbic
areas, including the amygdala, anteri-
or cingulate cortex, and orbitofrontal
cortex.20
Drug use is not unique in this re-
spect; other stimuli to which individ-
uals are strongly attracted have been
found to evoke activity in these neur-
al circuits. Subjects aroused by sexual-
ly explicit videos activate many of the
same limbic system areas as drug
craving does.21 Furthermore, the con-
scious attempt to suppress arousal
may also engender a distinct pattern
of brain activation.22 For this reason
neuroimaging may be more informa-
tive than peripheral measures that are
capable of revealing sexual prefer-
ences.
Objects that are feared or disliked
may also be discerned by brain imag-
ing. Amygdala responses to pho-
tographs of upsetting scenes and un-
pleasant facial expressions are among
the most reliable findings in the
imaging literature on emotion.23 In-
deed, the amygdala response to such
stimuli is detectable even when the
photographs have been presented at
subliminal exposure durations and
subjects are not aware of having seen
them.24 
Forensic Imaging 
The ability to know a person’s atti-tudes and thoughts and to pre-
dict their actions would be particular-
ly useful within the criminal justice,
intelligence, and immigration en-
forcement communities, where inter-
viewees are often motivated to lie or
to withhold desired information. Sev-
eral different applications of func-
tional neuroimaging are being ex-
plored with support from these com-
munities.
Lie detection is one of the most
sought-after applications. The work
of Langleblen and colleagues attract-
ed tremendous media attention when
it showed differences in subjects’
brain activation when bluffing versus
telling the truth about symbols on
playing cards.25 Lee et al. mapped the
differences in brain activation in a
memory task between honest test
performance and simulated malinger-
ing.26 Such research has a long way to
go before it can be used to detect
spontaneous, genuine deception. The
forms of deception being detected in
these studies involve highly con-
strained questions and may reflect
nothing more than the additional
cognitive effort required to deceive.
The “guilty knowledge test,” used
for decades with peripheral measures
of autonomic response, has been
adapted for use with scalp-recorded
event-related potentials (ERPs) and
marketed by ERP researcher
Lawrence Farwell. The method is
based on the difference in the P300
ERP evoked by familiar and unfamil-
iar stimuli. In Farwell’s “brain finger-
printing,” people, objects, or scenes
associated with a crime are presented
to an individual to determine
whether the brain recognizes the
image as familiar (such as whether a
crime scene appears “familiar” to the
brain despite the subjects claim he
has never been there). The Brain Fin-
gerprinting company’s web site de-
scribes the method as “a new para-
digm in criminal investigations and
counterterrorism,”27 and indeed it
has been admitted as evidence in
court28 and is being promoted as a
means of screening for terrorists, de-
spite the reservations of leading ERP
researchers such as Emmanual
Donchin.29
In addition to the problem of dis-
criminating intentional lies from
truth, brain imaging is potentially ap-
plicable to a related problem of great
legal significance: the problem of dis-
criminating false memory from
veridical memory. A false memory is
a kind of memory error that occurs
when a person mistakenly believes
that he or she remembers an event
that did not actually take place.
When false memories are induced in
the laboratory, they evoke patterns of
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activity in memory-related areas of
the brain that are distinctive from
both veridical memories and correct
judgments that an event did not hap-
pen. Whereas both veridical and false
memories activate the hippocampus,
the parahippocampal region is acti-
vated more strongly by veridical
memories.30
Finally, the effort to predict future
violent crime may eventually be aided
by functional neuroimaging. Some
offenders commit one violent crime
and live the rest of their lives without
harming anyone, whereas others con-
tinue to be violent. Personality factors
correlate to some degree with these
tendencies, but more recently PET
and fMRI have been used on an ex-
perimental basis to distinguish these
two populations.31 
Imaging Specific Thoughts 
Perhaps the most science-fic-tionesque example of brain imag-
ing as mind reading comes from
studies of high-level vision. Although
visual processing does not have the
obvious personal and social relevance
that we associate with social attitudes,
emotions, or tendencies to violence,
the striking thing about work in this
area is the specificity of the mental
content that can be recovered by ana-
lyzing a brain image. Haxby and col-
leagues scanned subjects while they
viewed numerous pictures each of
faces, cats, houses, chairs, scissors,
shoes, and bottles.32 They found that
the overall pattern of activation in the
ventral extrastriate cortex enabled
them to classify the stimulus category
been viewed by the subject with 96
percent accuracy.
Working with a reduced set of
stimulus categories, O’Craven and
Kanwisher accomplished a similar
feat with subjects’ purely mental im-
ages, formed from memory in the ab-
sence of a visual stimulus.32 After first
showing subjects pictures of faces and
houses and noting the locations of
maximum activation to each type of
stimulus, they instructed the same
subjects to imagine faces and houses.
For a majority of the scans, the re-
searchers were able to tell whether a
subject was thinking about a face and
a house just by explaining the scan.
Ethical Issues in Neuroimaging
The main ethical problem that thescientific trends just reviewed
pose concerns privacy. As with any
testing method that reveals new kinds
of information about an individual
(genetic testing for breast cancer risk,
for example), it may not always be in
the individual’s best interest to have
that information available to others.
There is an added dimension of ethi-
cal significance when the information
concerns the kinds of personal traits
and states that neuroimaging may re-
veal. The current technology can, in
some cases, breach the privacy of a
person’s own mind, for example lay-
ing bare a disavowed attitude toward
particular races. It may eventually be
possible for employers, juries, parole
boards, or law enforcement to exam-
ine your brain in order to answer: Are
you prone to depression? How neu-
rotic are you? To whom are you sexu-
ally attracted? How do you feel about
other races? What scares you? Have
you abused illegal drugs?
An individual need not know
when images are used to obtain per-
sonal information. Images used for
one purpose, for example medical di-
agnosis, may nevertheless reveal unre-
lated private information to whatever
party evaluates (or subpoenas) the
image. The experimental paradigm
used by Phelps and colleagues to cor-
relate amygdala activation with racial
attitudes simply required subjects to
view pictures of faces, and it could be
administered in the guise of a face
perception study. Brain activation can
reveal attitudes and feelings that the
subject may not be aware of having.
For example, although subjects in
Whalen’s study were not aware of
having seen fearful facial expressions
when the expressions were presented
subliminally, and cortical brain re-
gions did not react to them, the
amygdala nevertheless responded.
What obstacles lay between the
present state of imaging technology
and the ability reliably to read per-
sonality, psychiatric history, truthful-
ness and so on from an individual’s
brain scan? One important limitation
of the current technology is the need
to aggregate data over multiple obser-
vations. When the individual subject
is the unit of analysis, the need for
multiple trials of data collection may
be impractical. Although fears or
cravings can be evoked repeatedly if
necessary, the recall of a specific
memory cannot be repeated without
changing the nature of the memory
itself. For most of the examples cited
here, subject groups must be com-
pared in order to obtain reliable dif-
ferences between groups (between
formerly depressed and never-de-
pressed individuals, for example), or
to detect a relation to a trait (such as
extraversion).
Nevertheless, even a scanning pro-
tocol that is incapable of reliably clas-
sifying all individuals may be able to
classify individuals with relatively ex-
treme patterns of brain activity, and
It may eventually be possible for employers, juries, parole boards, or law 
enforcement to examine your brain in order to answer: Are you prone to 
depression? How neurotic are you? To whom are you sexually attracted? How do
you feel about other races? What scares you? Have you abused illegal drugs?
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so may be seen as a useful screening
tool in certain circumstances. In one
lab, for example, at least half of re-
cently detoxified cocaine users could
be identified by differential amygdala
response to drug-related versus non-
drug-related pictures.34 In another,
simple visual examination of whole
brain activity patterns allowed at least
a fraction of the subjects to be sorted
by personality trait.35 Even when pat-
terns of brain activation are not ex-
treme, they provide information suf-
ficient to narrow the range of an indi-
vidual’s likely values on psychological
traits of interest. Using only the pub-
lished data in reports of imaging cor-
relates of personality traits, a new in-
dividual’s trait level could be bracket-
ed within a range of 2.0 to 3.5 stan-
dard deviations (depending on the
study), compared to the 4.0 standard
deviation range of the population.36
Illusory Accuracy 
In addition to privacy concerns,neuroimaging is liable to over-re-
liance on, or misapplication of, infor-
mation from brain scans. The ability
to assess personality, attitudes, and
desires would be of interest in screen-
ing for employment, school tracking,
or military service. The ability to dis-
tinguish between truth and false-
hood, or veridical and false memory,
would find wide use in the legal sys-
tem. The demand for these abilities,
coupled with the inevitable misun-
derstandings of brain imaging among
the lay public, sets the stage for mis-
use. Physiological measures, especially
brain-based measures, possess an illu-
sory accuracy and objectivity as per-
ceived by the general public. In
proposing the use of brain finger-
printing as a screening tool at air-
ports, one commentator wrote, “Al-
though people lie . . . brainwaves do
not.”37
Although brainwaves do not lie,
neither do they tell the truth; they are
simply measures of brain activity.
Whether based on regional cerebral
bloodflow or electrical activity, brain
images must be interpreted like any
other correlate of mental activity, be-
havioral or physiological. Brain im-
ages and waveforms give an impres-
sion of concreteness and directness
compared to behavioral measures of
psychological traits and states, and
high-tech instrumentation lends an
aura of accuracy and objectivity. Nev-
ertheless, the psychological interpre-
tations of these measures are far from
direct or intrinsically objective. As the
foregoing review suggests, progress
has been made in the use of such
measures, and some inferences to so-
cially relevant traits and states can
now be made with a degree of cer-
tainty under specific and highly con-
trolled conditions. However, the cur-
rent state of the art does not allow re-
liable screening, profiling, or lie de-
tection.
There is no reason to doubt that
the state of the art will improve in the
coming years. Brain-based measures
do, in principle, have an advantage as
indices of psychological traits and
states over more familiar behavioral
or autonomic measures. They are one
causal step closer to these traits and
states than responses on personality
questionnaires or polygraph tracings.
Imaging may therefore one day pro-
vide the most sensitive and specific
measures available of psychological
processes. For now, however, this is
not the case, and there is a risk that
juries, judges, parole boards, the im-
migration service, and so on will use
these technologies prematurely. 
Brain Enhancement
The psychopharmacology of themid-twentieth century depended
entirely on serendipity. The antihista-
mine chlorpromazine was accidental-
ly found to calm agitated schizo-
phrenic patients and reduce their psy-
chosis. Another early drug investigat-
ed for its antipsychotic properties,
imipramine, turned out to be ineffec-
tive for that purpose, but was ob-
served to lift the mood of some of the
patients taking it. When a small
number of patients with major de-
pression tried it, the therapeutic effect
was dramatic, and imipramine con-
tinues to be used as an antidepressant
today. The second antidepressant to
be discovered, iproniazid, was hither-
to used as an antibiotic for treating
patients with tuberculosis when its
mood-elevating properties were ob-
served. Similar accidental discoveries
led to the identification of ampheta-
mine as a stimulant in the course of
refining a treatment for asthma, and
meprobamate as an anti-anxiety treat-
ment in the course of testing an an-
tibiotic.38 
Such lucky accidents were then
augmented by trial and error tests
with other molecules of similar struc-
ture. Parallel to this development, re-
searchers began to understand the ef-
fects of these drugs on brain function,
identifying the specific neurotrans-
mitter systems affected by the drugs
and the mechanisms by which the
drugs interacted with these systems.
The advent of direct-binding assays
in the 1960s provided the first direct
approach to testing and comparing
the affinity of a drug for different
The militarys substantial support for brain-machine interfaces
suggests that some think normal healthy individuals 
might someday be enhanced by neural prostheses.
neurotransmitter receptors, and the
tools of the molecular biology revolu-
tion, including the cloning of rare
subtypes of receptors, allowed for the
design of highly selective agonists, an-
tagonists, and other molecules to in-
fluence selectively the process of neu-
rotransmission.
The continual improvement in
side-effect profile of modern psy-
chotropic medications is due to the
increasing selectivity of drug action
made possible by the methods of
molecular neuroscience. “Selective” is
the first S in SSRI, the class of drugs
to which fluoxetine (Prozac) belongs.
New drugs with ever more selective
actions on the neurochemistry of
mood, anxiety, attention, and memo-
ry are under development. Although
intended for therapy, many of these
drugs affect brain function in healthy
people, raising the possibility of their
use for enhancement of normal func-
tion rather than remediation of dys-
funtion.
The enhancement potential of
some medications is, in itself, nothing
new, and the attempts of human be-
ings to use chemical substances to
alter normal affective and cognitive
traits is as old as the drinking of alco-
hol. Until recently, however, psy-
chotropic drugs had significant risks
and side effects that limited their at-
tractiveness. This situation is chang-
ing as side-effect profiles become
more tolerable. In addition, therapy
in conjunction with other drugs is an
increasingly common strategy for
counteracting the remaining side ef-
fects. For example, the most trouble-
some side effect for users of SSRIs is
sexual dysfunction, which responds
well to the drug sildenafil (Viagra).
Other drugs specifically developed to
counteract the sexual side effects of
SSRIs are in development and clinical
trials. The result of both new designer
drugs and adjuvant drugs is the same:
increasingly selective alteration of our
mental states and abilities through
neurochemical intervention, with
correspondingly less downside to
their use by anyone, sick or well.
Technical advances in non-phar-
maceutical methods for altering brain
function are also creating potential
enhancement tools. Transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) and,
more rarely, vagus nerve stimulation
and deep-brain stimulation have al-
ready been used to improve mental
function or mood in patients with
medically intractable neuropsychi-
atric illnesses.39 Research on the ef-
fects of non-pharmaceutical methods
on brain function in normal individ-
uals has been limited to the relatively
less invasive TMS. Mood effects on
normal healthy subjects have been in-
vestigated in the context of basic re-
search on mood and brain function,40
and at least one laboratory is devoted
to the development of TMS methods
for enhancing normal cognition.41 Fi-
nally, there is growing research inter-
est in computer augmentation of
brains. Most research on brain-ma-
chine interfaces currently focuses on
capturing and using movement com-
mand signals from the brain and car-
rying sensory inputs to the brain, for
example from a video camera.42 One
research program is tackling memory
augmentation by developing a pros-
thetic hippocampus that can be inter-
faced with a rodent brain.43 The mo-
tivation for this research is partly sci-
entific, to better understand neural
coding of sensory, motor, and memo-
ry information, and partly clinical, to
help patients with paralysis and pe-
ripheral sensory impairments. 
Nevertheless, the military’s sub-
stantial support for this research sug-
gests that some think normal healthy
individuals might someday be en-
hanced by neural prostheses.44
Enhancement of Normal Mood
Amphetamines, barbituates, ben-zodiazepenes, and other “moth-
er’s little helpers” have long been used
to improve the moods of healthy peo-
ple. However, the high potential for
addiction and tolerance with these
drugs dissuades most people from
using them. Pre-SSRI antidepres-
sants, while presenting no such risks,
have unpleasant side effects that limit
their appeal only to those faced with
clinical depression as the alternative.
The SSRIs, in contrast, have relative-
ly narrower neurochemical effects and
consequently fewer side effects. The
result, as Peter Kramer described in
Listening to Prozac, is that many peo-
ple who would never have taken a tri-
cyclic antidepressant are taking
SSRIs.45
Of course, most people using
SSRIs meet DSM IV criteria for some
psychiatric disorder, although not
necessarily major depression: dys-
thymia (a mild depression), social
phobia (an extreme form of shyness
and self-consciousness), premenstrual
dysphoric disorder (a recurrent nega-
tive mood associated with PMS) and
various eating disorders respond well
to SSRIs. It nevertheless remains con-
troversial whether some of these diag-
nostic categories are medicalized la-
bels for normal variants of human
personality, which do not necessarily
require pharmaceutical treatment. In
addition, some people using SSRIs
have no recognized illness. These in-
clude people who have suffered from
depression in the past and choose to
continue medication prophylactically,
as well as people who, in Peter
Kramer’s words, feel “better than
well” when taking an antidepressant. 
What is the effect of SSRIs on nor-
mal, healthy individuals? While no
systematic studies have examined in-
dividuals who choose to take these
medications, a handful of studies
have assessed the effects of SSRIs on
mood and personality in randomly
selected healthy subjects over short
periods of a few months or less.46 Ef-
fects on mood are relatively selective,
reducing self-reported negative affect
while leaving positive affect neither
increased nor decreased. The drugs
also increased affiliative behavior in
laboratory social interactions and co-
operative/competitive games played
with confederates. For example, sub-
jects on the drug spoke fewer com-
mands and instead made more sug-
gestions. In one double-blind
crossover design, subjects were not
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only more cooperative in a game, but
showed real world changes in behav-
ior as well: Flatmates found the sub-
jects less submissive on citalopam,
though no more dominant or hos-
tile.47 Although more research is
needed to clarify the effects of SSRIs
and other antidepressant agents on
mood and behavior of normal
healthy subjects, and long-term stud-
ies are needed on those who choose to
take SSRIs in real-life settings, the ev-
idence so far suggests subtle but salu-
tary effects without significant short-
term side effects.
Enhancement of Cognition 
Our current ability to enhancecognition through the direct al-
teration of brain function involves
two types of cognitive function: at-
tention and memory. “Attention” is
used here in its broadest sense, in-
cluding active use of working memo-
ry, executive function, and other
forms of cognitive self-control. These
are the cognitive abilities most obvi-
ously deficient in the syndrome of At-
tention Deficit Hyperactivity Disor-
der (ADHD). These same abilities
vary in their strength within the nor-
mal population. Indeed it seems like-
ly that ADHD represents the lower
tail of the whole population distribu-
tion rather than a qualitatively differ-
ent state of functioning, discontinu-
ous with the normal population.48
Drugs targeting the neurotrans-
mitter systems dopamine and
norephinephrine are effective in treat-
ing ADHD, and have been shown to
improve normal attentional function
as well. Methyphenidate (Ritalin) and
amphetamine (Adderal), as well as
modafinil (Provigil, a newer drug ap-
proved for regulating sleep) have been
shown to enhance attention across a
variety of different tests in healthy
young volunteers.49
Do these laboratory-measured im-
provements translate into a noticeable
improvement of real world cognitive
performance? No experimental evi-
dence is available, but the growing il-
licit use of ADHD medications on
college campuses suggests that many
young adults believe their cognition is
enhanced by the drugs.50 Parents also
appear to find real world benefits for
their normal children with ADHD
medication: In certain school districts
the proportion of boys taking
methylphenidate exceeds the most
generous estimates of ADHD preva-
lence.51
Memory is the other cognitive
ability that can, at present, be manip-
ulated to some degree by drugs. Inter-
est in memory enhancement has so
far been confined to the middle-aged
and elderly, whose memory ability
undergoes a gradual decline even in
the absence of dementia. The most
commonly used method involves ma-
nipulation not of memory circuits per
se but of cerebrovascular function.
Herbal supplements such as Gingko
Biloba affect memory mainly by in-
creasing blood flow within the brain.
However, the effectiveness of this
treatment is questionable.52 How
close are we to more specific and ef-
fective memory enhancement for
healthy older adults?
As the molecular biology of mem-
ory progresses, it presents drug de-
signers with a variety of entry points
through which to influence the spe-
cific processes of memory formation.
A huge research effort is now being
directed to the development of mem-
ory-boosting drugs.53 The candidate
drugs target various stages in the mol-
ecular cascade that underlies memory
formation, including the initial in-
duction of long-term potentiation
(LTP) and the later stages of memory
consolidation. There is reason to be-
lieve that some of the products under
development would work for en-
hancement as well as therapy. For ex-
ample, treatment of healthy human
subjects with an ampakine, which en-
hances LTP, improved performance
in a dose-dependent manner.54
Few consider memory enhance-
ment for the young to be a goal. Al-
though some specialized pursuits
such as certain competitive card
games could conceivably benefit from
super-memory, evidence suggests that
the forgetting rates of normal young
humans are optimal for most purpos-
es.55 Empirically, prodigious memory
has been linked to difficulties with
thinking and problem solving,56 and
computationally, the effect of boost-
ing the durability of individual mem-
ories is to decrease the ability to gen-
eralize.57
Indeed, in some circumstances re-
duced learning would confer benefit.
Memories of traumatic events can
cause lifelong suffering in the form of
post traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD), and methods are being
sought to prevent the consolidation
of such memories by intervening
pharmacologically immediately fol-
lowing the trauma.58 Drugs that in-
terfere with the consolidation of
memories in general, such as benzodi-
azepines, are well known.59 Extending
these methods beyond the victims of
trauma, to anyone wishing to avoid
remembering an unpleasant event, is
yet another way in which the neural
bases of memory could be altered to
enhance normal function.
As the molecular biology of memory progresses, it presents drug designers 
with a variety of entry points through which to influence the 
specific processes of memory formation. A huge research effort 
is now being directed to the development of memory-boosting drugs.
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Ethical Issues in Enhancement
Although the promise of enhance-ment is easy to identify—
smarter, more cheerful, and more ca-
pable people—the risk is harder to ar-
ticulate. Most people feel at least
some ambivalence about neuropsy-
chological enhancement, but distin-
guishing realistic or compelling argu-
ments from generalized fear is often
difficult.
Many of the ethical issues raised by
neuropsychological enhancement also
arise with other types of enhance-
ment.60 Cosmetic surgery and the use
of human growth hormone for
healthy children who are naturally
short, for example, are medical en-
hancements that do not affect brain
function, and though both are con-
troversial, both are generally accepted.
Enhancement techniques that affect
brain function through more familiar
and non-neuroscience-based inter-
ventions such as biofeedback, medita-
tion, tutoring, or psychotherapy are
not seen as objectionable, and, in fact,
are often seen as laudable. What,
then, are the objections to using phar-
maceutical or other neurotechnologi-
cal means to achieve the same ends as
behavioral techniques? Much recent
discussion has focused on this ques-
tion.61 Although few if any ethical
concerns arise uniquely in connection
with neuroscience-based methods,
two concerns seem particularly salient
in the context of neural interventions
for enhancement compared with
other biomedical interventions whose
targets are not psychological, on the
one hand, and behavioral interven-
tions for psychological enhancement,
on the other.62
The first of these concerns is safety.
Safety is a concern with all medica-
tions and procedures, but in compar-
ison to other comparably elective
treatments such as cosmetic surgery
or growth hormone treatment, neuro-
science-based enhancement involves
intervening in a far more complex
system. We are therefore at greater
risk of unanticipated problems when
we tinker. Would endowing learners
with supermemory interfere with
their ability to understand what they
have learned and relate it to other
knowledge? Might today’s Ritalin
users face an old age of premature
cognitive decline? These are empirical
questions, of course, which can only
be answered in time. So far, medica-
tions such as SSRIs and stimulants
have good safety records, and their
long-term effects may even be posi-
tive. For example, SSRIs have been
shown to be neuroprotective over the
long term.63 A recent study of the ef-
fects of Ritalin on rat brain develop-
ment showed both desirable and un-
desirable effects on later adult behav-
ior.64 Nevertheless, drug safety testing
does not routinely address long-term
use, and relatively little evidence is
available on long-term use by healthy
subjects. It remains an open empirical
issue whether the net effects of these
or other yet-to-be developed drugs are
positive or negative.
The second concern about neuro-
science-based enhancement is more
complex and difficult to state suc-
cinctly. This is actually a group of re-
lated concerns resulting from the
many ways in which neuroscience-
based enhancement intersects with
our understanding of what it means
to be a person, to be healthy and
whole, to do meaningful work, and to
value human life in all its imperfec-
tion. The recent report of the Presi-
dent’s Council on Bioethics empha-
sized these issues in its discussion of
enhancement. At the heart of this
group of concerns is the problem of
reconciling our understanding of per-
sons and brains.65
Among the widely shared intu-
itions about persons are the following:
Persons have a kind of value that is in-
dependent of any commodity or ca-
pability they bring to the world. Per-
sons are responsible for their actions
and deserve blame or respect depend-
ing on those actions. Persons lead
lives that have meaning, and although
it is difficult to say exactly what is
meant by “meaning” in this context,
most of us would agree that accom-
plishments in life are made meaning-
ful partly by the effort they require.
Finally, persons endure over time; al-
though some of their characteristics
may change, there is a self that re-
mains constant for as long as the per-
son can be said to exist.
Brains are physical systems and as
such do not share any of the foregoing
qualities. Of course, neuroscience-
based enhancements work because
changes to the brain result in changes
to the person. To use such enhance-
ments, without infringing on our per-
sonhood, can seem a contradiction, or
at least perplexing, and raises a num-
ber of concerns. Maximizing the per-
formance capabilities of an already
healthy, functional person can be
viewed as commodifying human abil-
ities. Improving behavior pharmaco-
logically seems to detract from the re-
sponsibility of the person for his or
her own actions. Reducing the effort
needed for personal accomplishments
by neurochemical means may reduce
their meaning as well. And the chang-
ing of abilities, memories, and moods
at will by swallowing a pill may un-
dermine the idea of a constant “self.”
Pending Challenges
Technologies for monitoring and
manipulating the brain have devel-
oped rapidly over the last few decades
and are poised for continued growth.
Some of the ethical problems posed
by these developments have immedi-
ate practical consequences. Examples
of such problems include the illusory
accuracy of brain images in forensic
contexts and the unknown safety of
long-term stimulant use by healthy
adults and children. Other ethical
problems are on the horizon, pending
further technological progress. For ex-
ample, brain imaging will not pose a
serious threat to privacy until scan-
ning methods can reliably deliver use-
ful information about individual sub-
jects. Although this is not the case at
present, the development is foresee-
able and could have enormous practi-
cal consequences.
Another way in which develop-
ments in neuroscience will influence
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society is less tangible than those just
mentioned, but no less consequential.
Both brain imaging and brain-based
enhancement are forcing us to con-
front the fact that we are physical sys-
tems. If specific abilities, personality
traits, and dispositions are manifest in
characteristic patterns of brain activa-
tion and can be manipulated by spe-
cific neurochemical interventions,
then they must be part of the physical
world. Our intuitions about person-
hood do not mesh easily with this re-
alization. At the very least, the realiza-
tion calls for a considerably more nu-
anced idea of personal responsibility
in law and morality.65 More generally,
it will prove challenging to traditional
ideas regarding the soul, or the non-
material component of the human
mind. 
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